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Abstract: 
The South Sudanese civil war is showing an increasing tendency towards an ethno-political 
conflict. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret these as the root causes of the conflict. 
Rather, the claim of the former liberation movement and now ruling party SPLM/A to be the 
sole representative of South Sudanese politics represents a major obstacle to peaceful negoti-
ation processes in the South Sudanese “political settlement”. The international community 
was not able to provide adequate answers to this issue. In fact, it supported SPLM/A’s claim to 
sole representation by its engagement, and was thus contributing to a worsening of the cur-
rent tensions. 
 
Zusammenfassung: 
Der südsudanesische Bürgerkrieg nimmt zunehmend Charakterzüge einer ethnopolitischen 
Auseinandersetzung an. Dennoch wäre es verfehlt, darin die Ursachen des Konfliktes erkennen 
zu wollen. Vielmehr ist der Alleinvertretungsanspruch der ehemaligen Befreiungsbewegung 
und jetzigen Regierungspartei SPLM/A ein wesentliches Hindernis für einen friedlichen Verlauf 
der Aushandlungsprozesse im südsudanesischen „Political Settlement“. Die internationale 
Gemeinschaft hat keine Antworten auf diese Problematik gefunden und durch ihr Engagement 
diesen Alleinvertretungsanspruch faktisch unterstützt, was zu einer Verschärfung der gegen-
wärtigen Spannungen beigetragen hat. 
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Two and a half years after its independence, a massacre brought South Sudan back into the 
headlines of the world press. On April 21st, 2014, the UN peacekeeping mission in the country, 
UNMISS, announced the killing of more than 200 civilians in a mosque in Bentiu, the principal 
town for oil production in the north of the country.1 The city had just been occupied by oppo-
sition forces some days earlier. The South Sudanese opposition forces are led, among others, 
by the former Vice President, Riek Machar, whose dismissal in July 2013 marked the beginning 
of the current conflict. Since mid-December 2013, the opposition forces are fighting a bloody 
civil war against the central government under President Salva Kiir and the de facto single par-
ty/army SPLM/SPLA. 
 
Within the media coverage, the interpretation of the current situation in the sense of an “eth-
nic conflict” is particularly striking: indeed, assaults along ethnically defined fault lines are 
increasingly happening in the civil war. For example, the government forces used systematic 
violence against the Nuer people in Juba in December 2013. The latest massacre, this time 
committed by opposition forces, is said to have taken place following a similar pattern. Accord-
ing to UNMISS, the victims were selected because of their perceived ethnic affiliation.2 A few 
days earlier, government troops apparently were involved in a massacre of Nuer people in Bor, 
the capital of the traditionally troubled region of Jonglei.3 
 
Despite the increasing ethno-political mobilisation in the South Sudanese civil war it would be 
misguided to simply classify the current hostilities as an “ethnic conflict”. This paper aims at 
presenting an alternative interpretation. It will do so by giving a brief overview of the history 
and the interests at stake in the current conflict. The power monopoly of the SPLM, the partic-
ular operational modes of the South Sudanese “political settlement” and the international 
engagement, which has supported this process substantially, are elaborated as the significant 
factors for analysing the current fighting. 
                                                             
1 UNMISS, 21 April 2014, “Hundreds massacred in Bentiu violence”; meanwhile, the US called for sanctions 
against those potentially responsible for the massacre imposed by the UN Security Council, cf. Sudan Tribune, 
23 April 2014, “US says it’s ‚horrified‘ by Bentiu massacre amid calls for UNSC sanctions”. 
2 “At the Catholic church, SPLA in Opposition soldiers similarly asked civilians who had taken refuge there to 
identify their ethnic origins and nationalities and proceeded to target and kill several individuals”, UNMISS, 21 
April 2014. Besides Nuer, who, according to reports, were not willing to actively welcome the opposition forc-
es, mainly Darfuris were selected, cf. Sudan Tribune, 22 April 2014, “Over 200 civilians massacred in Unity 
state’s targeted killings, says UN”. The main reason for this might be the increasing cooperation of the Darfur 
rebel movement JEM with the South Sudanese army, cf. ICG, 10 April 2014, South Sudan: A Civil War by Any 
Other Name, Africa Report No. 217, 18. 
3 Sudan Tribune, 17 April 2014, “30 people killed following clashes at UN base in Jonglei: reports”. 
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Armed struggle for the SPLM/A – the second edition 
The current violent infighting in the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) 
is not new. A surprisingly similar split in the liberation movement occurred in the midst of the 
second stage of the thirty-one-year-old ongoing Sudanese civil war due to tectonic shifts in the 
regional balance of power: the Ethiopian Mengistu regime was overthrown, and as a conse-
quence the SPLA, led by the charismatic John Garang, lost a key ally.4 A group around the other 
party leaders Riek Machar, also a major protagonist in the current fighting, and Lam Akol split 
away from John Garang – soon also called the “Torit faction”, named after a city in the South 
of the country – and established a SPLA opposition grouping. This opposition was then called 
“Nasir faction”, named after the agreement signed in the southern Sudanese town of Nasir, 
the Nasir declaration.5 
 
Several years of bloody battles between the two factions followed subsequently, also external-
ly fuelled by the Sudanese government as well as by other international interferences. In 1991, 
the fighting culminated in the so-called “Bor Massacre” 2,000 civilians, Bor-Dinka, were killed 
by the SPLA-Nasir. It was not until two decades later, in August 2011, that Riek Machar, now 
vice-president of the independent South Sudan, gave a late apology for his personal responsi-
bility in those events. In 2001, after a lengthy mediation process on the community level, es-
pecially between Dinka and Nuer, and after a corresponding truce between the factions from 
1999, the armed conflict could be eventually settled with a reconciliation of Garang and 
Machar.6 
 
This reconciliation, however, remained just on a formal level. Machar gained significant influ-
ence – and respective positions – in the party and government under Garang’s successor (he 
died in a helicopter accident in 2005) Salva Kiir. Nevertheless, the structural factors that led to 
the intra-party struggles in 1991 have not been resolved and reappeared again in December 
2013, albeit in a somewhat modified form. There are mainly four components responsible for 
the still-existing inner-party contradictions of the SPLM/A: besides the ethno-political context 
these are regional disparities, and political-strategic interest situations divergent in a way that 
makes it difficult to combine them in a single political party. These factors all culminate in the 
                                                             
4 Douglas H. Johnson, 2011, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars: Peace or Truce, Revised Edition, Wood-
bridge: James Currey, 91-110. 
5 Øystein H. Rolandsen, 2005, Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s, 
Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 54-80. 
6 Johnson, Root Causes, 120-126. 
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issue of governance within the South Sudanese resistance, and, after 2011, in the South Suda-
nese state. 
 
(1) The ethno-political context is undoubtedly of relevance. This is highlighted also by recent 
anthropological studies, especially in relation to the traditional tensions between Dinka and 
Nuer.7 The battles that occur repeatedly within the southern Sudanese guerrilla movements 
have often articulated themselves along ethnic fault lines. However, as previously stated, this 
factor should not be over-estimated as being primarily decisive: ethno-political issues in most 
cases are the consequence of contradictions on other levels. Often, they are nothing else than 
the result of conscious ethno-political mobilization aiming at constructing a tapered discursive 
bridge that obscures the multiple existing overlapping tensions between, as well as within the 
predefined “ethnicities”. 
 
(2) Ethno-political tensions not least can be traced back to regional disparities. Such disparities 
– although in the international perception concealed by the longstanding North-South conflict 
– also have existed and still exist within South Sudan for centuries and date back to the pre-
colonial period. The oil reserves in the border region between the two Sudanese states along 
with the respective transfer of resources from the North of South Sudan to the capital Juba in 
the far South further exacerbated this situation. This has been vastly increasing since the con-
clusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA) and 
the respective agreement on wealth sharing between North and South Sudan in 2005.8 
 
(3) Moreover, different strategic interests, concerning political as well as the concrete ques-
tion of power within the South Sudanese socio-political setting heavily influence the ethno-
political tensions. The issue of state independence, for example, was an important factor for 
the SPLA split in 1991. Riek Machar, Lam Akol and representatives of the old Anyanya guerril-
las strictly demanded a South Sudanese state, while John Garang along his “New Sudan Vision” 
explicitly rejected this and wanted to focus the movement on the Sudan as a whole.9 Present-
ly, questions of regional political alignment again play a substantive role, as well as aspects of 
the South Sudanese political system and the question of the selection and the potential role of 
international partners. Such power interests prove to be surprisingly fluid, however: this is 
                                                             
7 Stephanie Beswick, 2004, Sudan’s Blood Memory: The Legacy of War, Ethnicity, and Slavery in South Sudan, 
Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 191-192. 
8 Cf. Laura James, 2011, „From Slave to Oil“, in: John Ryle et al., The Sudan Handbook, Woodbridge: James 
Currey, 79-83. 
9 Cf. Johnson, Root Causes, 97-99. 
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embodied prototypically by Salva Kiir , who as a vice president of the SPLM/A was fully loyal to 
John Garang’s “New Sudan Vision”, but switched to demanding independence, a position 
which he had fought violently against just a few years before, almost immediately after 
Garang’s death. Such examples notwithstanding, political and strategic interest situations were 
and are an essential focal point of the “political marketplace”10 of both Sudanese states. 
 
(4) The core problem in the intra-South Sudanese conflicts of the past three decades, however, 
are issues related to the question of governance, concerning the former liberation movement 
and now ruling party SPLM/A. Two levels are to be distinguished: on the one hand, the issue of 
governance within the party, and on the other hand the organization of the South Sudanese 
political system and the particular role the SPLM/A plays therein as the unitary party. The 
question of intra-party democracy already in 1991 has significantly contributed to the intra-
party rift between Garang and Machar. Again in December 2013, the dispute as to whether the 
party presidency should be determined by a simple show of hands or by a secret ballot pro-
cess, gave rise to serious disputes.11 Unsurprisingly, the party leadership around Salva Kiir opt-
ed for an open electoral process, while the intra-party opposition described this as leverage 
for maintaining the status quo. 
 
This dispute, which at first might seem not overly relevant, gets its vital importance within the 
national context: the election of the chairman of the SPLM is in fact closely associated with the 
election of the South Sudanese president. There is no doubt that in the current political system 
the South Sudanese president will be a representative of the SPLM –the party itself in turn will 
rely on its leader as a candidate, or this leader will decide upon another candidate. Therefore, 
the issue of internal party governance in a context in which the SPLM is not only a player in the 
political arena, but rather represents the political arena entirely, is a truly national one. 
 
The attractiveness of the party is traditionally also strong on the level of political identity for-
mation. In the 1990s, the intra-party struggles were carried out under the party heading also 
on the side of the armed opposition (called SPLM/A-Nasir, SPLM/A-United). Even the current 
armed opposition has named itself “SPLM/A in opposition”. The only politically organized op-
position party of relevance is currently the SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC), led by Lam 
Akol, also proving it’s committed to the ideological legacy of the unity party by its self-
                                                             
10 Alex De Waal, 2009, Fixing the Political Marketplace: How can we make peace without functioning state 
institutions? Fifteenth Christen Michelsen Lecture, Bergen, 15 October 2009. 
11 Cf. ICG, Civil War by Any Other Name, 3-5. 
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labelling. The political opposition movement in Jonglei is insignificant since the death of 
George Athor and the concurrent political end of the South Sudan Democratic Movement 
(SSDM). The most relevant oppositional “strongman” in Jonglei at the moment, David Yau Yau, 
is cooperating with government troops, allegedly even against the “SPLM/A in opposition”.12 
 
SPLM/A and the South Sudanese “political settlement” 
The challenging issue of governance cannot be discussed without a more extensive analytical 
framework. The concept of the “political settlement”13 offers a promising approach for the 
analysis of a socio-political context as it is to be found in South Sudan. This entails a reading of 
the political game as a process of informal negotiations between elites at the national, region-
al and local levels, structurally located in both national as well as in other institutional set-
tings. Especially regarding the latter, Joel Migdal has introduced the concept of the so-called 
“strongmen”.14 Such “strongmen” play an active role of an informal elite pact that is rarely 
played out along the institutional settings provided by the formal government structures. The 
negotiations on a “political settlement” still are based on a common understanding of the elite 
players; nevertheless they are neither necessarily systematic nor peaceful. After all, as Jona-
than Di John and James Putzel have put it, a “political settlement” is about “bargaining out-
comes among contending elites”.15 Thus, common interest situations are fluid and dependent 
on specific political and economic advantages all actors want to and potentially can achieve 
from such an agreement. 
 
The South Sudanese “political settlement” is special insofar as the ultimate interests of nation-
al elites have always been negotiated with respect to the organization framework of the 
SPLM/A. Consequently, the SPLM/A is not a political actor, but rather represents the field in 
which the dealing takes place. The fact that the SPLM/A leadership –especially the party leader 
and state president – are not only seeing themselves as players in the settlement but also as 
referees of the whole process almost inevitably leads to highly problematic implications should 
other actors call for substantial re-negotiation. The given conditions almost certainly lead to a 
violent development of such a re-negotiation. 
                                                             
12 Sudan Tribune, 1 February 2014, “S. Sudan president welcomes deal with Yau Yau rebels”. 
13 Cf. Alan Whaites, 2008, “States in Development: Understanding State-building”, DFID Working Paper, Lon-
don; Thomas Parks and William Cole, 2010, “Political Settlements: Implications for International Development 
Policy and Practice”, The Asia Foundation, Occasional Paper No. 2. 
14 Joel S. Migdal, 1988, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 33-41. 
15 Jonathan Di John and James Putzel, 2009, Political Settlements, GSDRC Issues Paper, Birmingham. 
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Salva Kiir is an emblematic representative of a national “strongman” who embodies the com-
bination of both roles as a referee and a player at the same time. His “big tent” approach has 
aimed at co-opting all relevant political forces in South Sudan into the SPLM and thus into the 
state apparatus.16 Such a process comes not without a price tag; divergent fields of interests 
need to be paid in whatever form. This inevitably leads to a costly inflation of the political and 
technocratic apparatus: “the rationale for this ‘super-sized’ parliament and cabinet was that it 
would buy peace”.17 Against this background it sounds bizarre when a cabinet reshuffle, as 
Salva Kiir performed it in July 2013, was reasoned with the fight against corruption. From the 
very beginning, the whole government compilation was designed primarily for a large-scale 
buy-in of potential – or actual – competing elite factions. 
 
Rather, the government reshuffle – together with the subsequent allegations for treason and 
upheaval against the fallen eleven SPLM grandees (the political heads are currently called 
SPLM-718) – hence needs to be seen as a radical departure from the “big tent” approach. It is 
an attempt for an induced rearrangement of the South Sudanese “political settlement” from 
above. Currently, it is only possible to speculate on the specific causes of the actual termina-
tion of the informal agreement that in this form existed since the early 2000s. The upcoming 
2015 elections in both Sudanese states might play an important role, as well as the situation in 
Darfur and the solidifying alliance between JEM and the Government of Southern Sudan. At 
the same time, a drive within the pipeline politics can be noted: The construction of a pipeline 
in the direction of East Africa Kenya (along several present possible options) seems to become 
increasingly likely.19 
 
Domestic factors are likely to play a crucial, if not decisive role as well. These are, however, 
hardly understandable for everybody not directly and personally involved in the current 
events. At the structural level it is visible that the reorganisation of the South Sudanese “polit-
ical settlement”, necessary due to its termination by the SPLM leadership under Salva Kiir, 
apparently only can happen in a violent way. As stated, this is mainly caused by the fact that 
the SPLM claims the ownership of the entire political arena and, at the same time, insists on a 
                                                             
16 Cf. ICG, Civil War by Any Other Name, 5-7. 
17 Auditor General of South Sudan, Steven Wondu, cited in James Alic Garang, 2013, The Question of Big Gov-
ernment, and Financial Viability: The Case of South Sudan, The Sudd Institute Policy Brief, 1 February, 5. 
18 Seven of the initially eleven former SPLM representatives accused for treason currently are part of the Addis 
Ababa negotiations between the South Sudanese government and the armed opposition; cf. ICG, Civil War by 
Any Other Name, 1-2. 
19 Cf. ICG, Civil War by Any Other Name, 18-19. 
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quasi-dictatorial power allocation inside. However, these characteristics are not, at least not 
exclusively, to be understood as a lack of democratic tradition, attitude, or as a simple malig-
nancy of the actors involved. Rather, they are expressions of the high awareness by all actors 
of the fragility of the organization of the SPLM/A that has repercussions on the entire political 
system. An approach to answer such a weakness with concentration of political and armed 
forces, however, proves to be fatal. 
 
International state- and peacebuilding and the one-party-state 
Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, the international engagement has supported such a con-
centration of forces significantly – politically, economically, at the level of development coop-
eration and also at the level of military training for the SPLA in order to become the South 
Sudanese national army. Here too the logic of supporting the already existing structures initial-
ly was based on an inevitable pragmatism. A fast and effective response to the perceived 
threat of state collapse – the comparison with Somalia was omnipresent in the years before 
independence – after all was the primary entry point for the strong international engagement. 
Again, the logic of focusing on the existing infrastructure was initially based on the necessary 
pragmatism, to respond effectively to the, at the beginning of the strong commitment, omni-
present Somalia comparisons and related threats - the collapse of the state at the beginning of 
its independence. However, the initial scepticism of the international community vanished 
quickly and developed into a donor bonanza. More and more international players joined the 
South Sudan hype by developing and implementing flagship programs and flagship coopera-
tion. For European foreign and development policy, to name one example, South Sudan played 
an essential role: for the first time, the EU Commission and the Member States presented a 
jointly drafted country program20 and, with considerable effort, a designated EU compound 
was installed in Juba21. 
 
South Sudan rapidly became a salient projection of the OECD world’s foreign and development 
policy technocracy that in so doing, not at least, tried to keep the financially strong but on a 
political level perceived as inferior competition from China at bay. Yet, due to own technocrat-
ic achievements, the increasing optimism regarding its own activities soon turned into wishful 
                                                             
20 EU Single Country Strategy (Response Strategy) for South Sudan 2011-2013; cf. Mark Furness and Frank 
Vollmer, 2013, EU joint programming: lessons from South Sudan for EU aid coordination, gdi – German Devel-
opment Institute, Briefing Paper, 18/2013. 
21 In this compound, all relevant embassies and liaison offices of the EU and its Member States are concentrat-
ed. It was inaugurated by the EU commissioner for development, Andris Piebalds, in May 2011; cf. Andris Pie-
balgs, 2011, “South Sudan: towards the creation of a new state”, SPEECH/11/336. 
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thinking for the OECD actors. Consequently, neither the constant violence in Jonglei nor the 
flare-up of fighting between Sudan and South Sudan in April 2012 over the city of Heglig in the 
centre of the oil-producing region22 was understood as systemic problems. The UNSG’s Special 
Representative, Hilde Johnson, unsurprisingly concluded after the outbreak of the recent hos-
tilities: “We did not see this coming”23. Shortly before this statement, UNMISS had considered 
the political situation in South Sudan as cautiously optimistic. 
 
Thus, the now observable collapse of the immediate South Sudanese post-war order also puts 
the current international state-building concepts into question. South Sudan was one of the 
flagship countries in the implementation of the so-called “New Deal on Peace Building and 
State Building”24, adopted in November 2011 as part of the fourth “High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness” in Busan/South Korea25. This “New Deal” gained prominence insofar as it was 
for the first time that OECD countries adopted an international framework in cooperation with 
partners who considered themselves as fragile. Those fragile countries organised themselves 
in an internationally institutionalised format as a group of conflict-affected and fragile states, 
the so-called g7+26. South Sudan, an active part of the g7+, has been identified as one of the 
pilot countries for the implementation of the “New Deal”. 
 
With respect to the subsequent reciprocal institutional interest – on the part of the OECD 
countries as well as of the g7+ concerning the successful implementation of the “New Deal"”, 
on the part of South Sudan concerning a positive fragility assessment – it is hardly surprising 
that the assessment showed very positive results. In the publication of the results of the pilot 
assessment in December 2012 it is thus stated: “The overall assessment results suggests that 
the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) has made sufficient progress on all five PSGs since the CPA 
interim period and independence in July 2011 to move beyond the crisis stage of the fragility 
spectrum. While none of the PSGs have yet reached transition, reform efforts seem to have 
borne most fruit with regard to legitimate politics”.27 
 
                                                             
22 Cf. Jan Pospisil, 2012, “Eiskalte Interdependenzen: Der Südsudan radikalisiert seine politische Neuorientie-
rung an der Erdölfront”, oiip Kurzanalyse 1/12, Vienna. 
23 Cited in ICG, Civil War by Any Other Name, 28. 
24 Cf. http://www.newdeal4peace.org/. 
25 IDPS – International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011, A New Deal for engagement in frag-
ile states. 
26 Cf. http://www.g7plus.org/. 
27 Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2012, Fragility Assessment, Summary results, 1. 
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Not only has the structurally founded trend towards wishful thinking proved problematic, 
however. The foundational approach of the “New Deal” – the focus on “Country Compacts”, 
working through the institutions of the partner country and the commitment to the principle 
of “one vision, one goal” – has led to primarily negative consequences in the case of South 
Sudan. Undeniably, such approaches are consistent with the well-known and established de-
velopment cooperation principle of “ownership”. Still, in a situation of a fragile “political set-
tlement”, which additionally is being bargained under the aegis of a one-party system, these 
approaches show significant weaknesses. As it is currently evident, such weaknesses can turn 
into extremely violent events. It is hard for international actors to find simple ways out of this 
situation. In the light of current experiences, however, the “New Deal” already looks, only a 
few years after its adoption, rather old. Without far-reaching adjustments, this concept proba-
bly will not be able to serve as a recognized guideline for donors in the challenging realm of 
state- and peacebuilding. 
 
Conclusions: on how to overcome ethno-politics 
The current situation in South Sudan seems protracted. The negotiation processes carried out 
so far in Addis Ababa under the mediation of the East African regional organization IGAD have 
not been able to provide an end of hostilities. This is not a good sign for things to come, in 
particular in a worsening situation of increasing ethno-political tensions, where at the same 
time elections, which are a highly prestigious project for the current SPLM leadership, are im-
minent in the upcoming year 2015. There is room for positive developments, however: time 
and again, key actors in the South Sudan crises have proven to be more agile and flexible than 
what was expected. Hence, it is by no means impossible that protagonists of the currently 
illegalised opposition SPLM-7 (even Riek Machar himself) will legally participate in the forth-
coming presidential elections. 
 
Nevertheless, the all-encompassing claim to power of the state party SPLM – which is, in the 
last instance, recognized by all relevant stakeholders at present – provides a difficult condition 
for a transformation of the current violent clashes to a peaceful way of dealing with political 
controversies. As long as the political monopoly of power of SPLM remains, any competition 
along and re-negotiation of South Sudan’s “political settlement” will inevitably mutate into an 
intra-party power struggle. As history proves, such struggle neither can be solved by elections 
nor by other formal negotiation processes. Under such circumstances, even successful and 
peaceful elections in 2015 – as unlikely as this may seem at the moment – thus cannot be 
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counted as an indicator of a sustainable pacification of the situation. In fact, such an election 
process currently is nothing else than a formal rubber-stamp – and an according re-
confirmation – of a structural setting that has to be seen as the cause of inner-South Sudanese 
armed conflict in the last three decades. 
 
The international engagement therefore has to face a difficult balancing act: on the one hand, 
it is imperative to get the currently needed relief efforts and the subsequently necessary rec-
onciliation and reconstruction processes off the ground. On the other hand though, the neces-
sary strategic consequences of the present impasse have to be drawn. This requires a coopera-
tion focus on the legalization and formalization of the South Sudanese political process along 
the principle of a “grounded legitimacy”28, in a way acceptable to both the elite actors and the 
population. Such a focus, however, would contradict many of the principles of a traditional 
approach of liberal statebuilding and peacebuilding, in particular, to name just one prominent 
example, anti-corruption policies. Additionally, significant resistance of the currently dominat-
ing elite factions is to be expected; elite factions which are able to accommodate donor inter-
ests and master donor discourses very well. This problematique in peacebuilding and 
statebuilding is by no means new29; the according debate is a constant companion of all re-
spective interventions since the 1990s. 
 
Nevertheless, it hitherto was not possible to develop a cooperation approach that adequately 
supports a legalized, or at least non-violent political process. All established methods of inter-
national technical assistance, ranging from “rule of law” to conflict mediation, showed severe 
limitations in terms of their applicability and effectiveness in the South Sudanese case. The 
“political settlement”-approach promises far-reaching possibilities in terms of analysis, but its 
usefulness in the support of concrete and effective implementation is yet unknown. Any con-
structive and sustainable international engagement, however, will have to answer this ques-
tion. 
 
The current events prove once more that any success in statebuilding is not only hard to come 
by, but also difficult to sustain. Any results achieved in years or even decades of hard work can 
be destroyed within a few months. The current events furthermore demonstrate that in spite 
of the wide variety of all the existing approaches, in particular regarding the contextuality of 
                                                             
28 Cf. OECD, 2010, The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity, Paris: OECD, 41-46. 
29 Cf., e.g., Roland Paris, 1997, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism”, International Securi-
ty, 22:2, 54-89. 
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statebuilding and the catalogues of principles drawing upon that, a promising approach is 
clearly missing. The prominent example of South Sudan, where an internationally unanimously 
welcomed effort of a “state-building from scratch” was undertaken with substantial financial, 
technical and conceptual means, demonstrates that even the most massive externally assisted 
statebuilding project is ultimately decided along its inner contradictions – or, as the donor 
discourse calls it, its “context”. 
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